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Abstract — Natural disasters through infrastructure networks 
might aggravate or mitigate consequences to stakes. The 
objective of this paper is to characterize this kind of situation in 
order to provide a solid foundation for the decision aid. 
Characterization consists in determining decision aid criteria. It 
includes typology description, actions and potential actions 
identification, determining preference systems, as well as a set of 
specific problems to each phase. Through decisions aggregation, 
some recommendations are given. 
Keywords - decision aid, natural disaster, characterization, 
preference's system, vulnerability, risk, critical infrastructure 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Natural disaster complexity puts societies in uncertainty 
and ignorance situations. In such situations, Lifeline networks 
failure such as power grid, gas and telecommunication might 
aggravate consequences. It is then necessary to promote 
problem understanding through a formal description. Situation 
characterization is also called “typology” or “reality aspect. It 
consists in determining relevant criteria for the decision aid 
process. 
The first objective of this paper is determining best 
decisions to be taken in crisis situations for the city of Lourdes. 
The second is giving a generic framework for territorial crisis 
induced by lifeline network failure. 
To achieve these objectives, decision aid criteria are 
described. Phases in disasters’ crisis management, decision 
makers and actions that can reduce networks’ vulnerability are 
identified. The way of determining decisions weights for each 
criterion is described. Afterwards, decisions performances are 
aggregated. We then pointed out best actions and gave some 
recommendations for the city of Lourdes. Finally, we come to a 
conclusion and our perspectives. 
II. CASE STUDY 
This paper deals with Lourdes (France) decision problem 
characterization. Lourdes is a pilgrimage city par excellence 
since 1858. The city hosted during the 150th anniversary of the 
Virgin apparition nearby 70000 pilgrims. Moreover, Lourdes is 
situated in a high seismic area. The city wish to analyse 
vulnerability of three networks: drinking water, sewage, and 
road. 
From the network model based on graph theory, some 
decisions have been identified. They are presented in the next 
section. 
 
Figure 1: Case study 
III. DECISIONS 
Decision makers are likely to make arrangements and take 
decisions to solve identified problems. Decisions, also called 
actions, represent a possible contribution to the overall decision 
and likely, given the sub-process, to be independently 
envisaged, and to serve as a point of application through to 
decision aid [1]. 
Seven categories of action have been identified. The 
identification is made in a generic way in order to be 
expendable to other studies. These categories are based on a 
network vulnerability’s model presented in and [2]: 
• Action on distances ሺܣͲሻ : Distance between two 
components on the network incorporates several 
environmental parameters. Act on the distance in some 
cases comes down to reduce or increase the flux in a 
gas line; 
• Action on components’ centrality ሺܣͳሻ: Centrality is a 
structural parameter that quantifies in some way the 
importance of a component. A bridge which handles 
most vehicles will have a strong centrality. Reducing it 
comes to widen the bridge, or prohibit certain 
categories of vehicles; 
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• Action on fluxes’ circulation law ሺܣʹሻ: Adaptation of 
this law can contribute to streamlining of the entire 
network. This is especially what happens on the power 
grid, where electricity is supplied to vital structures; 
• Adding or removing component ሺܣ͵ሻ: Building new 
roads, airfields etc. It may also involve an action plan 
to increase reliability; 
• Action on emergency devices ሺܣͶሻ : Increasing a 
hospital autonomy by providing generators or 
additional beds; 
• Action on stakes ሺܣͷሻ: The evacuation of an area, the 
riser of a transformer, information ; 
• Action on interdependences ሺܣ͸ሻ : Interdependence 
might be a cause of cascading failure, when one 
component failure impacts other components failures. 
Acting on these interdependencies can help to 
significantly reduce networks vulnerability. 
Through these categories, it is noticeable that actions are 
vectors of several sub-actions. It is essential in this step for 
each sub-process, to identify potential actions. Potential action 
is fictitious or real action temporarily considered realistic by at 
least one decision maker [3], [1]. Before analysing these 
decisions through an aggregation method, their quantification 
by criteria is needed. In this paper, criteria come from the 
decision context presented in the following. 
IV. DECISION CONTEXT AND CRITERIA 
In crisis situation, decision process is based on the context 
which is a view of the problem. Context helps identifying 
invariants and bringing out problem initial understanding [4]. 
Our approach considers the context as a set of eleven 
components: 
  ൌ൏ ௜ ǡ ௝ܵ ǡ ܪ௞ ǡ  ௟ܰ ǡ ܦ௠ ǡ ܨ௢ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ܯ௧ ǡ ܣ௔ ൐ (1) 
Where ௜ ǡ  are territories, ௝ܵ  stakes, ܪ௞  hazards, ௟ܰ networks, ܦ௠  emergency devices, ܨ௢ fluxes, ܮ  decision 
level, ܴ  risk situation,   decision phases, ܣ௔  aggravation or 
mitigation factors. 
Weight is affected to each element on a scale from 0 
(worse) to 10 (best). These weights might be used in 
aggregation procedure. Territory hosts the others elements of 
the context. The way of it weight assessment is presented in the 
next section. 
A. Territory 
Territory is the physical and/or administrative entity that 
supports other components. Cities are assimilated to territory. 
Territory weight depends on the maximum number of city 
in the study. 
 ߙ୘೔ ൌ ିଵ଴ȁ୘೔ȁ୫ୟ୶ሺ୘೔ሻ ൅ ͳ (2) 
Where ߙ୘೔  is the weight, ȁ௜ȁ is the number of territories, ሺ௜) the maximum of city. For instance in the case study 
there is only one territory, so ߙ୘೔ ൌ Ͳ. One territory might be 
composed of many stakes presented in the following. 
B. Stakes 
Stakes are defined as a material or immaterial entity 
providing a function whose deterioration is damageable or 
prejudicial for the society [2]. Table 1 presents the weight of 
stake according to the importance. 
Stakes Weight
Human (deaf, injured traumatized) 0 
National Security 1 
Lifeline System 2 
Environment 3 
Economy(Employment losses, insurance,) 4 
Patrimony(P) 5 
Legislation 6 
Politic 7 
Education 8 
Comfort 9 
Table 1: Stakes 
The weight of each decision according to these stakes is in 
the performance table (Table 9). In disaster context, stakes are 
affected by networks failure. These networks are presented in 
the following. 
C. Networks types 
Territories good functioning is ensured by interdependent 
networks. Network weight is related to interdependences level 
among the overall network. We have identified 17 networks for 
territories good functioning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Networks 
For the case study, three networks are considered: road, 
sewage, and drinking water. Decisions weight according to 
their impact on network is shown in Table 9. Stakes and 
networks are submitted to some hazards presented in the next 
section. 
D. Hazard 
Hazard is an anthropic or natural phenomena not under 
control and susceptible to affect context components. In the 
same way hazards are also interdependent. For example 
earthquake can cause fire. Likewise, their weights are related to 
their interdependence level. For the case study, only earthquake 
is taken into account. 
Hazard Weight 
Earthquake 1,42 
Network  Weight
Transport 
Road 2,35 
Air 8,23 
Shipping 5,88 
Rail 5,88 
Energy 
Electricity 0 
Gas 7,64 
Hydro Carbide 8,23 
Health 
Sewage 2,35 
Drinking Water 8,23 
Hospital 9,41 
Waste, NBC 9,41 
Food 9,41 
Information
IT  4,11 
Telecommunication and GPS 3,52 
Audio-visual 8,82 
Postal 10 
Bank and Finance 4,7
Flood 5,71 
Volcano 1,42 
Tsunami 2,85 
Fire 4,28 
Cyclones 1,42 
Landslide 8,57 
Table 3: Hazard 
At the hazard occurrence, some emergency devices like 
hospitals, fire trucks will mitigate it consequences. Emergency 
devices for the case study are presented in the following. 
E. Emergency devices 
Weight associated to emergency devices must be 
determined by decision maker. In the case study, two 
emergency devices have been taken into account: a fire trucks 
(weight=3) and a hospital (weight=6). Moreover some 
elements that can aggravate or mitigate consequences are 
presented in the following. 
F. Mitigation or aggravations factors 
In the nature, some elements might mitigate or aggravate 
consequences to stakes. For example a dam can mitigate 
vulnerability related to flood, but it failure is aggravation 
source. In the case study, there are any mitigation or 
aggravation factors. 
Many services for territories are due to fluxes presented in 
the next section. 
G. Fluxes 
Finally time constraints and dynamic aspects are integrated 
in circulating fluxes (human, material, food, information, 
energy) through their circulation laws [2]. Fluxes weights 
depend on their importance estimated by decisions makers. In 
the case study, three fluxes are taken into account: Human, 
drinking water and sewage. 
Fluxes Weight 
Human 10 
Electricity 9 
Drinking 
water 
8 
Sewage 6 
Information 3 
Good 2 
Gas 1 
Car 1 
Truck 1 
Boat 1 
Train 2 
Hydro 
carbide 
4 
Waste 5 
Money 1 
Table 4: Fluxes 
The next element of the context is the decision level 
presented in the following. 
H. Decision levels 
Decision level corresponds to the decision aid process 
horizon. Literature presents three typical levels of decision-
inspired from military methods: Tactical operational level, 
strategic level, and semi-strategic level [5]. Decision levels are 
represented on three axes: Information (accurate-global), 
impact (local-national), and scientific dimension place (low-
very important). To these axis might be added: problem’s 
definition (how well it is defined); states’ variables 
quantification; nature (technical, organizational, etc.); 
complexity; goal (general, local); scope (long term, short term); 
coherence; and data certainty. 
  
Figure 2: Decision level 
Strategic decisions contrary to managerial decisions must 
be made in environment with imprecise and uncertain 
information [6]. Authors emphasize that most strategic 
decisions are made in groups [6]. 
Level depends on analysis phase. Figure 2 shows the 
situation of Lourdes on a scale from Ͳto ͳͲ, plotted in a radar 
diagram. It can be noticed that phases of simulation and 
stability are in an operational level, phases of investigation, 
post-event, and awareness in a semi-strategic level, phases of 
crisis, replication and warming in a strategic level. 
Decision levels weights are estimated as following: 
strategic level =3, semi-strategic = 7, Tactical= 10. 
To decision levels correspond some risk situations 
presented in the next section. 
I. Risk situation 
 
Figure 3: Risk situations 
The analysis situation depends on available information and 
Knowledge 
Non Exhaustive 
Incomplete Complete
Information  
Time
Total uncertainty 
Uncertainty 
Risk 
Investigation
Awareness 
Simulation
Warning 
Post-event
Crisis
Replication 
Stability
Exhaustive 
knowledge. Merad in [5] has identified tree situations in risk 
analysis: total uncertainty (incomplete information and 
knowledge is not exhaustive), risk (full information, exhaustive 
knowledge), uncertainty (between the two situation, with 
subjective probabilities).  
Figure 3 layouts Lourdes situation. Based on phases, it 
shows that phases of stability, post-event crisis and simulation 
are in a risk situation; phases of warming in an uncertainty 
situation; phases of replication, awareness, and investigation in 
a total uncertainty situation. 
Decision risk situation weight is estimated as following: 
Total uncertainty=1, uncertainty =7, risk= 10. 
The next step of the characterization is decision phases 
identification presented in the following section.  
J. Decision aid process phase identification 
According to Simon in [7], decision is not an act but a 
process carried out to solve problems. He argues that decision 
has four main phases in the field of management: Intelligence, 
Modelling, Selection and Evaluation. Phases are the mean 
times in a decision process [5]. Phases are named “process 
progress states” in a multi-criteria approach [1], or “criticality 
of the environmental context”. Harding et al (2001) in [8] 
pointed out three phases applicable in such situation: pre-crisis, 
crisis and post crisis. These phases don’t include all 
specificities inherent to critical infrastructure failure. 
In this paper, eight phases have been identified. For each 
phase, the weight is parenthesised: 
• Investigation (1) to understand the hazards and the 
stakes: This is the phase of ignorance which aims to 
identify risks; 
• Awareness(5) of the situation: In this phase, the risk is 
known, which means the beginning of cognitive 
processes to integrate the risk culture; 
• Simulation(2): To evaluate different scenarios through 
models more or less elaborated; 
• Warning(8): Appearance of the hazard’s signs; 
• Crisis(10): Occurrence of the hazard; 
• Replication (9): The event is over but the risk of 
recurrence is high. Replicas are seen especially when it 
comes to earthquakes; 
• Post-event(6): The crisis is over, but it remains to 
rebuild and repair damages; 
• Stability (3): This is the last phase. Choices are 
evaluated and feedback formalized. 
For the city of Lourdes, after the situation analysis, and 
meetings with the “Bureau risques-environnemnt”1 we pointed 
out simulation phase. 
Different categories of Decision makers are presented in the 
next section. 
                                                           
1 The direction in charge of risk analysis 
K. Decision makers categorization 
Decision makers (DM), also named actors or stakeholders, 
refer to individual or individual group of which by their value 
system, whether at first degree because of their intentions or 
second degree by the way the involves those of others, directly 
or indirectly influences decision [1]. Any decision aid should 
start by their identification [9]. It follows that disaster crisis 
management involves several decision makers: constituted 
profession, composed of experts, local authority and rarely an 
isolated individual. Decision maker has objectives, preferences, 
elimination criteria, information system. Final decisions are 
validated through their objective’s systems. 
By way of illustration, Table 5 shows Martel’s 
identification approach by decision makers’ participations and 
influences in [5]. 
Directly 
involved 
Indirectly 
involved 
Influence the problem Fiduciaries Invisibles 
Affected by the problem Concerned and 
active 
Concerned and 
passive 
Influence and is affected 
by the problem 
Traditional Behind curtains 
Table 5: Martel's decision maker identification 
Identification through Table 5 is less applicable to disaster 
management. Indeed one decision maker might influence and 
be affected. Then, identification by implication and objective 
categories seems more relevant. 
Category Example Weight
Category 1: 
International 
Word 1 
continental 
Community 
Category 2
National 
Department 4 
City 
Category 3
Local 
Local operator 6 
Site 
Category 4
component 
Component (Ex 
nuclear power plant) 
10 
Category 5
Analyst 
 2 
Table 6: Decision maker categories 
In Table 6 five categories have been identified from high 
objective level (International) to the low objective level 
(component). Each category might include: 
Lourdes vulnerability analysis involves many decisions 
decision makers: City of Lourdes, prefecture, the National 
Engineer Scholl of Tarbes, and networks managers. These 
DMs are in categories 2 and 3. 
According to phases, influence might exist between 
decision makers, an approach of modelling these influence is 
presented in the next section. 
1) Influence between decision makers 
Influences between DMs in disaster situation are emotions: 
fear, anxiety, stress etc. Graph theory is used for influences 
modelling in Figure 4. Nodes are DMs, edges are circulating 
emotions. Influences and dependences might exist in the graph. 
Some techniques such as those of Markov can be used to affect 
weight to each decision makers. 
Figure 4 : Decision maker influence 
Because of the fact that this analysis is in the simulation 
phase, there are not influences between DMs. 
Influences also depend on which phase is the analysis. Each 
decision-maker can express in all phases, but cannot take any 
decision. The identification of decisions problems is presented 
in the following section. 
V. DECISION PROBLEMS 
Problems correspond to the manner of envisaging and 
formatting conclusions and decisions. Bernard Roy in [1] has 
identified four problems in decision aid. Choice ( ఈܲ ), which 
takes the form of a subset selection; sorting ( ఉܲ ), which 
corresponds to a form of assignment to predefined categories; 
rank ( ఊܲ ) which takes the form of a ranking actions, and 
description ( ఋܲሻ  for describing and structuring. ఋܲ  precedes 
other problems [4]. In natural disaster context, we pointed out 
two others problems: acceptance and change management, and 
planning problem. 
A. Problem Ȧ acceptance and change management 
In disaster context, the four classical problems are not 
enough to include all situations. Indeed, there’s a problem of 
acceptance and change management. One situation might be 
well described but not accepted. The problem ߱ is encountered 
in post crisis phases. 
B. Problem ț of planning 
The problem of planning is justified by dynamism of 
actions and uncertainties. 
These problems, function on the study phase, are presented 
in Table 7. 
Phases Problematic Objectives 
Investigation ఋܲ ఈܲ, ఉܲ,ܲɘ Identifying risk 
The awareness 
of the situation
ఋܲ, ܲɘ Establishment of the culture of risk 
Simulation ఋܲ, ܲɘ Elaboration of scenarios 
Warming ఋܲ ǡ ఈܲ Information et communication 
Crisis ఋܲ ǡ ఈܲǡ ఉܲ ǡ ఊܲǡ சܲ Minimize the consequences for stakes
Replication ఋܲ ǡ ఈܲǡ ఉܲ ǡ ఊܲǡ சܲ Minimize the consequences for stakes
Post- Event ఋܲ ǡ ఈܲ, ఉܲǡ ఊܲ, ܲɘǡ ܲɈ Restoration of affected infrastructure, action planning 
Stability ఋܲ ǡ சܲ, ܲɘ Formalization of a feedback 
Table 7: Problem per phase 
Several preference systems could be used for performance 
aggregation. Next section presents these systems according to 
phases en decision makers. 
VI. PREFERENCES SYSTEMS 
Actions cannot be compared one by one because of their 
generic definition. To accomplish this comparison, decision 
makers, or the analyst judging in their name, must develop a 
relational preference system. This system reflects diverse views 
that can be opposed, or even contradictory. Thus, the system 
must tolerate ambiguity, contradiction and learning wherever 
possible [1]. Preference systems are also called “approach and 
the dominant culture” [5]. Preference systems are set of beliefs, 
attitudes and assumptions shared by a group as a result of past 
experiences [5]. 
There are four basic preference situations: ܫ (indifference), ܲ  (strict preference), ܳ  (low preference), ܴ  (incomparability). 
The totality of a decision maker’s preference can be grouped 
into the fundamental relational system of preference, or in the 
grouped relational system of preference [1], including the 
outranking relation ሺܵሻǡ  the presumption of preference ሺܬሻǡ 
general preference ሺ൐ሻ, non preference ሺ̱ሻ, K-preference ሺܭሻǤ 
Table 8 shows relational preference system for each class 
susceptible to be involved in Lourdes crisis management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Relational preference systems 
Table 8 illustrates systems accepting and refusing 
incomparability: ሺܫ ൐ሻǡ ሺܫǡ ܳǡ ܲሻǡ ሺܫǡ ܴǡ ൐ሻǡ ሺܴǡ ܵሻǡ ሺܴǡ ܫǡ ܵሻǤ 
Decision makers of category ͳ admit incomparability in critical 
phases. This is due to the fact that before these phases data is 
available at the local level. Risk for stakes allows taking time 
needed for the analysis. This situation is similar for the second 
class, except the investigation phase - where data is less 
available. However, in line with regulatory requirements, and 
facing potential communication and collaboration process, 
decision maker has to accept the incomparability in level ͵. 
The result is that: 
• ሺܫǡ ൐ሻ can be associated with a structure of complete 
preorder. In this case there exists a function ݃ such 
that: 
 ൜ ܽᇱܫܽ ֞ ݃ሺܽᇱሻ ൌ ݃ሺܽሻܽᇱ ൐ ܽ ฻ ݃ሺܽᇱሻ ൐ ݃ሺܽሻ (3) 
• ሺܫǡ ܳǡ ܲሻand ሺܫǡ ܴǡ ൐ሻǡcan be associated with a pseudo-
order structure. Similarly there exists a function ݃ such 
that (for the system ሺܫǡ ܳǡ ܲሻ): 
 ቐ ܽᇱܫܽ ฻ െݍ ൑ ݃ሺܽᇱሻ െ ݃ሺܽሻ ൑ ݍܽԢܳܽ ฻ ݍ ൏ ݃ሺܽᇱሻ െ ݃ሺܽሻ ൑ ݌ሺ݃ሺܽሻሻܽԢܲܽ ฻ ݌ሺ݃ሺܽሻሻ ൏ ݃ሺܽᇱሻ െ ݃ሺܽሻ  (4) ݍ is a non-negative constant called indifference threshold, ݌ሺ݃ሺܽሻሻ  denote a real-valued function called threshold 
preference. It is defined on the set of values taken by ݃ሺܽሻ and 
required to verify: 
Phases Decision maker 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Investigation I,P,Q R,P,Q,I R,S 
The awareness of the 
situation 
I,P,Q I,> , R,S 
Simulation I,P,Q I,> , R,S 
Warming I,P,Q I,> R,S 
Crisis R, I,> R,S R,S 
Replication R, I,> R,S R,S 
Post- Event I,P,Q R,I,S R,S 
Stability I,P,Q R,,I,S R,S 
DM1 DM2 DM3 
 ቐ ݌൫݃ሺܽሻ൯ ൒ ݍ௣ቀ௚൫௔ᇲ൯ቁି௣ሺ௚ሺ௔ሻሻ௚ሺ௔ᇲሻି௚ሺ௔ሻ ൒ െͳ (5) 
• ሺܴǡ ܵሻ and ሺܴǡ ܫǡ ܵሻ have an outranking structure. They 
require an outranking approach. 
VII. PERFORMANCE AGGREGATION 
According to previous sections analyse, we point out that a 
relational preference system ܫǡ ܲǡ ܳ is faced. (see Table 8). 
Furthermore, a problem ఈܲ (choice) is will be investigated. 
Several decisions comparison is rarely made with a single 
criterion [10]. Consensus solutions are generally researched 
with these conflicting and antagonistic criteria [11]. The 
advantage of multi criteria decision aid is not only seeking the 
optimum of a single criterion, but to seek a compromise on 
several criteria. 
Criterion 
Decision 
A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
Territory 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Stake 2 1 2 0 3 7 2 
Network 7,7 8,2 2,4 7,6 8,2 8,2 2,4 
Hazard 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,4 
Emergency device 6 3 6 6 6 6 3 
Mitigation factors 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flux 6 6 10 8 10 10 1 
Decision level 3 4 8 6 9 10 5 
Risk situation 7 5 8 6 8 9 2 
Phase 2 2 7 6 9 10 2 
Decision maker 4 7 4 3 5 5 2 
Total 39 38 49 44 60 67 21 
Table 9 performance 
Table 9 shows performances of each decision according to 
context criteria. 
Many methods in the literature can be used for this 
performance aggregation. We choose here a unique synthesis 
criterion. Unique synthesis criterion is to synthesize the family 
of criteria into a single criterion. It consists in building a single 
criterion synthesis using an aggregate function ܸ by putting: ݃ሺܽሻ ൌ ܸሺ݃ͳሺܽሻǡ ݃ʹሺܽሻǡ ݃͵ሺܽሻǡ ǥ ǡ ݃݊ሺܽሻሻ  (6 ) 
In this category can be cited MAUT, UTA, AHP, Product 
ratios weighted. We assume that criteria have same weights 
equal to 1. A simple sum is then used for performance 
aggregation. 
Results show that actions on stakes ሺܣͷሻ are the most 
important, followed by those on emergency devices ሺܣͶሻ and 
on fluxes ሺܣʹሻǤ In the situation of Lourdes, stake is mainly the 
pilgrims. Action consisted in evacuation, and then we have 
recommended construction of more evacuation area in a 
nearest city Tarbes. 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
Natural disasters are becoming more deadly for societies. 
The number of victims and material damages are difficult to 
estimate. On one hand, natural disasters directly affect people 
and critical infrastructure; on the other hand, a large proportion 
of damage is induced by networks failure such as power grid, 
roads, gas. The impact and importance of these networks in 
crisis management remain poorly understood. 
The objective of this paper was to promote the 
understanding of crisis situation management by determining 
best decisions in a generic way. The first step of the 
characterization was to describe the decision situation in order 
to establish a framework of the analysis. One of the 
particularities we have identified in crisis management is the 
interweaving of several phases. The identification of these 
phases allows decision makers to better understand various 
difficulties. The paper then answered the question "Who are the 
decision makers for the vulnerability analysis?” We have also 
defined actions that could be taken to make systems less 
vulnerable, as well as the problem encountered. A radar graph 
analysis allowed us to define different levels of decision. Thus 
confirming what many authors think: the phases of the crisis 
and replication are the most sensitive. Finally we have 
elaborated a relational system of preferences for different 
decision makers and have proposed an operational approach for 
each of them. 
The work presented in this paper provides a better 
understanding of the problem situation and allow decision 
determination. This understanding is an essential step in 
managing any crisis situation. As we described in the 
presentation of the overall methodology, this analysis is a link 
in a chain. We plan to continue by proposing a structuring of 
the situation described so far. This structure should allow the 
application of an approach operation decision aid. 
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